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to produce the information is not great.8" However, when nonemployees
are admitted to production areas of the plant, the possibility of inter-
ference with production and disruption of employee discipline is al-
ways present. Whenever the threat of such disruption has been sig-
nificant, the Board has been reluctant to allow union activities it might
otherwise permit. 5 Therefore, in future cases the Board should not take
the language of Fafnir at face value. Rather, it should weigh the more
substantial employer interests involved and be more reluctant to permit
time studies than it has been in granting information requests.
Roy 1. Schmidt
Parolee Not Protected Against Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures by H-is Parole Officer
PAROLE-SEARCH AND SEizuRE-CoNsTITU ONAL LAwr-Acting on
information received from an informer whose identity was never re-
vealed, defendant's parole officer and four narcotics agents met defen-
dant and searched his car. The search was made without a warrant and
not incident to defendant's arrest. The officers discovered heroin and
arrested defendant who was thereafter convicted of unlawful possession
of heroin.' On appeal, defendant claimed that the officers proceeded
without probable cause and thus subjected him to an unreasonable search
and seizure. The California District Court of Appeal for the Third Dis-
trict affirmed, holding that the fourth and fourteenth amendment pro-
tection against unreasonable search and seizure2 does not extend to a
parolee. People v. Hernandez, 229 Adv. Cal. App. i88, 40 Cal. Rep. ioo
(3 d Dist.), petition for hearing denied, 6i Adv. Cal. No. 21, Minutes 3
(1964).
In People v. Cahan3 the California Supreme Court expressly incorpo-
34. Where requiring the employer to furnish the information would result in a substantial
burden on the employer, the Board has been hesitant to require him to do so. See note 11 supra.
35. Thus, no-solicitation rules are valid when applied to employees in the selling area of a
department store but are invalid when applied to nonselling areas. Maxam Buffalo, Inc., 139
N.L.R.B. 1040 (1962); Meier & Frank Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1950). Such rules are presumed
valid if they apply to working time, Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943) (dictum) (cited
with approval in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803-04 (1945)), but are in-
valid if they apply to nonworking time unless shown to be necessary for discipline. NLRB v. Illi-
nois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1946). A similar distinction is drawn between employees
and nonemployees distributing literature on the assumption that employees are less likely to disturb
plant discipline. 40 MlsNr. L. Rav. 726 (1956); 65 YALE L.J. 423 (1956).
1. Possession of narcotics violates CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11500.
2. See also CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 19.
3. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). Cahan adopted the exclusionary rule for California
six years before the United States Supreme Court extended the rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
rated the provisions of the fourth amendment under the due process
aegis of the fourteenth,' and adopted the rule that evidence seized by
unreasonable search and seizure will be excluded to preserve due pro-
cess. Until Hernandez the question whether the fourth amendment
guarantee (and hence the Cahan exclusionary rule) extended to parolees
remained unanswered. People v. Denne' assumed arguendo that the
fourth amendment applied but held that because of the "unique rela-
tionship" between a parole officer and his parolee, a parole officer's search
of a parolee's home was not an unreasonable search when the officer
acted on information of parole violation obtained from an identified
informer. Three subsequent district court of appeal cases reached simi-
lar results and dealt only with the reasonableness of the search involved;6
two of these, like the instant case, involved unidentified informers. In
1958, however, the California Supreme Court held in Priestly v. Superior
Court7 that the identity of an informer must be disclosed to the defen-
dant at the preliminary hearing or testimony regarding his information,
necessary to establish probable cause for the search, will be inadmissible.'
The Hernandez court thought it necessary to reach a detente between
the Priestly rule, which would exclude the evidence gathered during the
search because the informer was not identified, and the rule of the Denne
group of cases, which would make the search reasonable. Rather than
distinguishing Priestly as not involving a parolee, the court held that a
parolee is not protected against his parole officer by the fourth amend-
ment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, rea-
sonable cause was not required, and the Priestly rule requiring identi-
fication of informers was inapplicable.
The court, in an opinion by Justice Friedman, rejected the doctrine
of probable cause by analogizing a parolee to prison inmates who do not
have the usual federal and state constitutional rights guaranteed to non-
incarcerated citizens. Prison inmates may be subjected to intense sur-
veillance and search in spite of the fourth amendment.9 The court rea-
4. "Although this amendment, like each of the other provisions of the original Bill of Rights,
applies only to the federal government . . . , '[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary in-
trusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society.
It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' . . . and as such enforceable against the
states through the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment.]'" 44 Cal. 2d 434, 438,
282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955).
5. 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297 P.2d 451 (2d Dist. 1956).
6. People v. Contreras, 154 Cal. App. 2d 321, 315 P.2d 916 (3d Dist. 1957) (unidentified
informer); People v. Robarge, 151 Cal. App. 2d 660, 312 P.2d 70 (2d Dist. 1957); People v.
Triche, 148 Cal. App. 2d 198, 306 P.2d 616 (1st Dist. 1957) (unidentified informer).
7. 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
8. The federal standard requires that the informer's identity be revealed unless there was
enough evidence apart from his confidential communication to establish probable cause for the
search. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). The Priestly rule is substantially the same,
and the Priestly opinion describes the federal rule as "sound and workable." 50 Cal. 2d at 817, 330
P.2d at 42.
9. Cf. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
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soned that a parolee, although outside prison walls, is still constructively
a prisoner. Even though his apprehension resembles arrest, it is in fact
simply a return to custody. The court adopted this strict view of parole,
reasoning that close surveillance is necessary to guard against criminal
acts by parolees. Such acts cause great public outcry and endanger the
parole system.
Recognizing that a parolee is still constructively a prisoner of the
state does not compel utilization of the Hernandez approach. The court
could have achieved the same result more properly by approaching the
problem as one involving the reasonableness of the search rather than
by denying the applicability of a constitutional guarantee. The latter
approach is of questionable validity both in the immediate context and
in its possible implications.
The supreme court's opinion in In re Jones" suggests the sounder
approach. Jones involved a prisoner who complained of cruel and un-
usual punishment and hindrance of access to the courts. Writing for the
court, Mr. Justice Peters pointed out that the fourteenth amendment ap-
plies to "persons." "A person is not deprived of all his constitutional
rights by reason of his incarceration for a felony .... A convicted felon,
although civilly dead ...is nevertheless a 'person' entitled to the pro-
tection of the Fourteenth Amendment."'1 Thus, the California Supreme
Court has recognized that the basic constitutional structure remains in-
tact even where the rights of incarcerated prisoners are involved. Read
in the light of People v. Cahan, In re Jones would lead to the conclusion
that the Hernandez court erred in removing the constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures from the felon Hernan-
dez and that his conviction based upon evidence obtained through such
a search deprived him of liberty without due process of law.
The presence of a constitutional guarantee to be free from unreason-
able searches and seizures does not mean, however, that the content of
that guarantee should be inflexible. A prison inmate could be subjected
to searches and seizures to which a parolee ought not to be subjected.
A parolee is a "constructive" prisoner of the state," not a detained one.
The extraordinary incursions of individual rights that take place in
prison are justified by the necessity of keeping order in a society of crimi-
nals." A parolee is a criminal who has shown "a disposition to reform
10. 57 Cal. 2d 860, 22 Cal. Rep. 478, 372 P.2d 310 (1962).
11. Id. at 862, 22 Cal. Rep. at 479-80, 372 P.2d at 311-12. See Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S.
255 (1941); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
Mr. Justice Peters opposed the California Supreme Court's denial of hearing in the Hernandez
case. 61 Adv. Cal. No. 21, Minutes 3.
12. In re Marzec, 25 Cal. 2d 794, 154 P.2d 873 (1945).
13. See In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 12 Cal. Rep. 753, 361 P.2d 417, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
864 (1961).
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and whose reformation may reasonably be expected .... ."" He lives
in a normal society. The rationale that justifies complete freedom of
prison officials to search an inmate does not apply as between a parole
officer and his parolee. The question should be whether the search is
reasonable under the circumstances.
Had it recognized that constitutional guarantees apply to all per-
sons, the court could have noted, as did the Denne court, that the appli-
cation of constitutional guarantees varies with the situation; it could
then have considered the "unique relationship between a parole officer
and his prisoner"15 in determining the reasonableness of the search. The
court could have concluded that the very nature of the relationship fur-
nished probable cause for a parole officer's search of his parolee. This
"unique relationship" could also have been employed to distinguish
Priestly, a non-parole case, which would require identification of the
parole officer's source of information. The Hernandez court could have
found that a search by a parole officer of his parolee requires only a good
faith belief on the part of the officer that parole has been violated to
avoid being unreasonable. The reasoning of the court which led it to
deny the applicability of the search and seizure guarantee might have
been employed with equal force in holding the search of Hernandez to
have been reasonable.
Denying a constitutional right to Hernandez, rather than recogniz-
ing the existence of the right and its inherent flexibility, may have seri-
ous and far-reaching implications. It is true that the court limited its
decision to the situation where the parole officer is instrumental in the
search and seizure; it is also true that a subsequent California Supreme
Court decision has indicated that fourth amendment rights cannot be
denied when a defendant's parole status is not relied upon in conduct-
ing a search.' Nevertheless, the Hernandez decision may be a danger-
ous precedent, for denial of one right may indicate a willingness to
deny additional rights to parolees-surely a result to be discouraged. The
circumstances which might be considered as making the Hernandez
search reasonable-e.g., the fact that the parole officer, not the police,
conducted the search-may well be absent in future cases. By removing
a constitutional guarantee, the courts have lost the flexibility necessary
to preserve even the slightest semblance of privacy to the parolee.
In part, the approach in this case seems to be based on a one-sided
view of parole which leaves unfulfilled underlying policies of the parole
system. The importance of this system to the administration of criminal
14. Roberts v. Duffy, 167 Cal. 629, 634, 140 Pac. 260, 262 (1914).
15. 141 Cal. App. 2d at 509, 297 P.2d at 457.
16. People v. Gallegos, 62 Adv. Cal. 177 (1964) (granting fourth amendment protection
where defendant's parole status not established or relied on).
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justice has been stressed by the Chief Justice of the United States.17 He
believes that an enlightened prison system and an understanding parole
system are the best and cheapest security against crime the nation can
provide for its citizens. He has also pointed out that without an effective
parole system, our prisons would be swamped, and in a few years "we
would need many times the number of prisons with many times the
capacity of those we have today."' 8 Similarly, both case and commen-
tary recognize that the parole system is designed to be humanitarian and
reformatory 9 Conditional liberty is granted to reform prisoners and
make decent citizens out of them. The Hernandez court seemed to ac-
knowledge this, pointing out that half of all parolees "reach the goal of
rehabilitation." 20
But to treat the parolee only slightly better than he was treated in
prison would seem to make reform unnecessarily difficult. The court
maintained that the parolee "has at least as much protection [against
invasion of privacy] as he had within the prison walls."'" This answer
is unsatisfactory. A parolee is not within prison walls. He has been re-
leased because his conduct under close prison surveillance has led to the
belief that if released he may become a decent citizen." Why then
cripple his chances to reform "as much as a cast on his leg .. .would
weaken him for running" ?2 No persuasive reason appears, yet remov-
ing from a parolee one of the most basic rights of citizenship, the right
to privacy and protection from unreasonable search and seizure, must
inevitably handicap him in learning to exercise properly the rights and
duties of free citizenship. One cannot be expected to learn to behave re-
sponsibly while his every movement is watched and restricted. A parolee
should be given maximum freedom consonant with his progress; he
must be given some degree of privacy in the management of his own
possessions. To deprive him of this essential protection is to undermine
the parole system as a valuable reformatory instrument and to subvert
an individual right long considered basic to our free society.
Roger B. Dworkin
17. Address by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PAROLE, PARIOLE
IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 26 (1957).
18. Id. at 29.
19. E.g., People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 507-08, 297 P.2d 451, 456 (2d Dist.
1956) (dictum); Workshop X, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PAROLE, PAROLE IN PRINCIPLE AND
PRACTICE 127-34 (1957).
20. 229 Adv. Cal. App. at 194, 40 Cal. Rep. at 104.
21. Id. at 195, 40 Cal. Rep. at 104.
22. See Roberts v. Duffy, 167 Cal. 629, 634, 140 Pac. 260,262 (1914).
23. Address by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, supra note 17, at 29.
[Vol. 17: Page 514
